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The term "summary" as applied to civil procedure had its
origin in the sumiata cognoscere of the Roman Law. In the
late Middle Ages it was applied by the Italian jurists to that
simplified and abbreviated form of procedure prescribed by the
decretal Saepe contingit (1306) of Pope Clement V, which came
to form the substratum of most of the modern Continental sys-
tems, as well as in considerable measure of the Anglo-American
chancery and admiralty procedures. Briegleb, in his classic study,
assails the correctness of this application 1 on the ground that
the Roman sumn tim cognosccre was not a merely simplified
and abbreviated version of the ordinary procedure, but a form
characterized by a provisional and incomplete hearing and
eventuating in a more or less provisional order,-a form, that
is to say, to which our proceeding on application for temporary
injunction would offer a fairly close analogy. According to his
view,3 the curtailed ordinary form is not a "summary procedure"
in any true sense, but one which is much more accurately de-
noted by the name "planary, ' " bestowed upon it by some of
Editor's Note: In editing this article the YALE LAW JOURN has aban-
doned its usual form in deference to the wishes of the author.
' BREIGLEB, EINLErrUNG IN DIE THEORIE DER SUMMALISCmmII PROZEsE
(1859) 12-18. Such use of the term began in the secular law. Ibid 79.
It appears in legislation and treaties of the Italian communes antedating
the Clementinz Saepe. 2 S.LvIOLI, STORiA DELLT P cO uC .u CrVLME E Cmu-
NALE (1927) 330.
2"As, for example, where application is made for the granting of the
boanrum possessio ex edicto Carbaniano or vcntris noomine, or for a prae-
torian cantio or for the provisional award of aliment, or, again, where
there is involved the anticipation of an action for the purpose of obviating
the prejudice feared from its not being brought until a later time, or
the postponement of a cause until after the disposition of another more
important one (exc. praejzudiei), or the duty of answering an interroga-
tory propounded in jure, or, finally, where the matter in question is the
mere exhibition of a thing in controversy or the surrender, on application
of one asserting ownership, of a thing which had been pledged to the
person presently in possession." WErZELL, SYSTEM DES ODENTLICIIMN
CIVIPROCESSES (3d ed. 1878) 303. See also WENGE, INSTITUTIONEN DES
R6IMISCHEN ZIVMPROZESSRECHTS (1925) 315-316.
3 BRIEGLEB, op. cit. supra note 1, at 12, 79-30.
4"Planaius procesdus," from "do plano." "Simpliciter et de piano, ac
sine strepitu et figura judicii." CLErm. S.%EPn and preceding papal legisla-
tion. See BmEGLB, op. cit. supra note 1, at 15 et scq., 79 et seq.; SALVIoLT,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 332-333.
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the fourteenth century jurist, or "expedited" (schleunig) em-
ployed by Briegleb himself. Nevertheless, the term "summary"
became firmly established in Continental usage, as applicable
to both sorts of variant procedure: namely, to that which differed
from the ordinary form only in its elements of simplicity and
abridgement, as well as to that which was guided by the princi-
ple of the Roman summatim cognoscere. In our own system
the term is familiar enough, but has never had the same exten-
sive field of application or found as its subject the same organ-
ized structure as on the Continent. Blackstone's only reference
to summary procedure is in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
whose proceedings he distinguishes as regular and summary.
The latter, in addition to common law proceedings for contempt,
comprise certain statutory proceedings wherein "there is no
intervention of a jury, but the party accused is acquitted or
condemned by the suffrage of such person only, as the statute
has appointed for his judge." 5 At common law, therefore, there
was no proceeding of a purely civil nature to which the term
was applied. Statutes, however, have everywhere provided, for
particular cases, civil proceedings wherein expedition is sought
by means of deviation from the ordinary rules in respect of
process, pleading or mode of trial. To these, by common consent,
the term "summary" has been extended. The reason for de-
parting from the ordinary rule varies with the case: sometimes
this departure is because of the concrete loss attendant upon
delay, as in the case of dispossessing tenants wrongfully hold-
ing over; sometimes it is because of the official character of the
defendant, as in the case of certain demands against sheriffs
and other public officers; sometimes it is because of the public
interest especially involved, as in the case of collection of taxes;
sometimes, again, it is because of the greater degree of moral
wrong attaching to the non-payment of a debt, as in the case
of a surety suing his principal for reimbursement. With these
individual instances of summary procedure the Anglo-American
law has in general been content; it usually admits generic forms
of abridged procedure for its inferior courts, but has been reluc-
tant to provide, for administration by the court which adminis-
ters the ordinary procedure, any collateral system of variant
rules applicable to broad classes or groups of cases-such, for
example as the procedure sommaire of the modern French law,
or the so-called "regular-indeterminate" summary procedure of
the German common law.6 Yet the annals of procedure in
America are not without instances of a contrary tendency, and
it is of three experiments in this direction that we would here
5 4 BL. CoL * 280.
6For these see ENGELMANN-MILLAR, HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE (1927) 578, 768.
SUMMARY CIVIL PROCEDURE
briefly speak. All three date from the period closing with 1850
-a period fruitful for American procedure not only because
of the emergence of the New York Code of 1848, but also bL-
cause of a host of smaller but highly significant reforms whose
history has been largely overshadowed by the commanding
figure of that Code. Two of the three measures in question now
belong to the realm of things forgotten, but the third continues
in active life as an integral part of the procedural system in two
important jurisdictions.
I
THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUmmARY PROCESS OF 1769
In South Carolina a local administration of justice was slow
of achievement. Except for the brief and unsuccessful career
of certain county and precinct courts established in 1'721,7 it
was not until 1768-nearly a century after the first settlement
-that steps were taken to change the existing situation under
which "Charlestown was the source and centre of all judicial
proceedings." 8 This meant that all common law civil business,
other than that falling to the justices of the peace, was dealt
with by the Court of Common Pleas sitting at the provincial
capital. But by 1768 the increase of population in the out-
lying districts was such as to render a reform imperative, and
in that year the Assembly adopted an act providing for a sys-
tem of circuits to localize the trial of both civil and criminal
causes, and otherwise re-regulating the judicial organization of
the province.9 This act, however, encountered opposition on the
part of the Lords of Trade and was rejected by the Crown on
the ground that, in making, as it did, the judicial tenure de-
pendent upon good behavior, instead of His Majesty's pleasure,
and rendering the appointment of sheriffs a purely provincial
matter, it constituted an invasion of the royal authority, being,
indeed, in the former regard, "indecent and disrespectful to His
Majesty." But, in the following year, the legislation was re-
enacted in such form as to obviate the objections in question and
was definitively sanctioned by the King in Council on November
29, 1769. Because of its own provision postponing its operation
until the completion of the court-houses and prisons necessary
7 W. R. S HrrH, SOUTH CAROLINA AS A ROYAL PRoNCEr (1903) 145-146;
WHITNEY, GOVERNmIENT OF THE CoLoNEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1895) 13
Johns Hopkins University Studies 83.
s 2 RAISAY, HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1S09) 125.
13"An Act for establishing Courts, building Gaols, and appointing
Sheriffs and other officers, for the more convenient administration of jus-
tice in this Province," April 12, 1768. 7. S. C. STAT. 197.
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for the new system, the act did not go into effect until Novem-
ber 5, 1773, pursuant to proclamation of May 19, 1772.10
The progress of this legislation from its inception to its ap-
proval forms an interesting episode in the history of the rela-
tions between the British Crown and the American Colonies,
but what concerns us here is the innovation which it accom-
plished in the field of procedure. Under the terms of the act
it was made lawful for the judges of the courts thus established:
"to determine, without a jury, in a summary way,11 on peti-
tion, all causes cognizable in the said courts, for any sum
not exceeding £20 sterling, except where the title of lands may
come in question: 12 In which suit the plaintiff and defendant
may have the benefit of all matters as if the suit were commenced
in the ordinary forms of common law or equity, and the said
judges are hereby required so to do, and to give judgment and
award execution, together with costs, against the body or goods
of the party against whom the same shall pass." It was also pro-
vided that "in case both parties shall desire to have the cause tried
by a jury, or on application of either party, at his own expense,
then the said judges shall immediately order issue to be joined,
and the said cause to be tried by the jury impaneled at such
courts." And it was further declared "that the said petition
shall contain the plaintiff's charge or demand, plainly and dis-
tinctly set forth: a true copy whereof shall be personally served
or left at the defendant's usual and notorious place of abode,
by the sheriff or his deputy twenty days before the sitting
of the said court." is
20 SMITH, op. cit. supra note "7, at 133-141; McCRADY, HISTORY OF SOUTH
CAROLINA UNDER THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT, 1719-1776 (1899) 639, 642.
The Act of 1769 does not appear in the South Carolina Statutes at Large
(see note to Nevils v. Hartzog, 4 Rich. L. 552, 553 (S. C. 1851)). So
much of it as remained in force in 1790, including the provisions relating
to the summary process, is printed in GRImy.9, PUBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE
OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1790) 268-273. These provisions are also incor-
porated in 1 BREVARD, ALPHABETICAL DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAW
OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1814) 221.13FMr. Lamb, counsel for the Board of Trade, had criticized this part
of the Act of 1768 on the ground that the pecuniary limit was too high.
SMITH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 136. But "the Lords of Trade got over
-the objection of Mr. Lamb to the summary jurisdiction clause as a law
of the same sort obtained in Ireland." McCRADY, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 639.
2 In consequence of the act of 1824 concerning Justice of the Peace
courts, the summary jurisdiction thereafter applied only where the demand
exceeded $20. Allen v. Singleton, 1 Rice 289 (S. C. 1839).
13 Act of 1769, § VI: GRICK9, PUBLIC LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1790)
270; BREvARD loc. cit. supra note 10.
It is not improbable that this legislation was suggested by the Virginia
statute of 1727, re-enacted in improved form in 1748, establishing a pro-
ceeding by petition and summons for small debt causes. The act of 17'27
(4 VA. STAT. (Hening) 195-196) provides that "it shall and may be
lawful to and for the justices of any county court to hear and deter-
mine all suits * * * for any debt or demand due by judgment, obligation,
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Such was the legislative basis of what came to be known as
the South Carolina "summary process"'-an expression con-
stantly abbreviated to "suim. pro." On this basis there was
built up a form of procedure admirably adapted to the purpose "
for which it was intended, and, in view of the general course
of Anglo-American procedural reform, one remarkable for its
precocity. The principles' of the system as thus developed were
as follows:
(a) In lieu of formal writ 15 and declaration there was em-
ployed the petition provided for by the act. In this the averment
of claim seldom needed to be more than the statement of a legal
conclusion. Thus, in an action against the indorser of a promis-
sory note, it was held sufficient to allege that the defendant "is
indebted as indorser," without any mention: of dishonor by the
maker, the court observing that in this form of proceeding, "the
plaintiff has always been permitted to state his case in the most
concise manner." - On another occasion, it was said that
or account, for any sum or sums of money or tobacco, of the value of
twenty shillings sterling or two hundred pounds of tobacco, and not exceed-
ing the sum of five pounds current money or one thousand pounds of
tobacco, by petition. And the said justices are hereby authorized and
required, and shall have full power and authority so to do, and to award
execution thereupon." Summons is to be issued upon the filing of the
petition and service to be effected by delivery of the summons with a
copy of the petition. If the defendant fails to appear, the justices are
to "determine the cause upon the evidence produced, or dismiss the suit,
as to them shall seem just." If, appearing, he puts in his "answer or plea,"
or fails to plead, then "the said justices shall instantly determine the
cause, in a summary way, upon such evidence as shall be given, and
shall give judgment according as the very right of the cause and matter
in law shall appear unto them, without regard to form, or want of form.
* * * In which proceedings the defendant shall have the benefit of
all matters in his defence, that he might have had, if he had been sued
in the ordinary forms of law."
By the act of 1748 (5 VA. STAT. (Hening) 499-500) which contains
the express declaration that the proceeding is to be had 'without
the solemnity of a jury," it is provided that the petition shall state
"whether the debt arises by judgment, obligation, or other specialty, or
by account," in which last case a copy of the account is to be filed with
the petition, and "that the court shall not admit of any delay in the
determination of any suit brought by petition till another court, unless
good cause be made to appear for such delay." This act also extends
the proceeding to actions of detinue and trover.
" In Hughes v. Phelps, 1 Brev. 81, 82 (S. C. 1802), it is said that "the
act must have had two principal objects in view: 1. The speedy determina-
tion of trifling controversies. 2. The determination of such suits with
as little expense to the parties as possible."
15 It appears that the petition in its character of process required the
seal of the court to be affixed. "It was the opinion of the majority of
the court in this case that a summary process ought to be sealed as a
writ; and that it is a judicial process2' Ibid. 51.
' See Hilburn v. Paysinger, 1 Bail. 97, 98 (S. C. 1828).
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"it is not requisite in this jurisdiction to set out the cause
of action in the body of the process with technical precision:
it is usually stated in general terms, referring to an account,
contract, or other writing, indorsed or annexed, for further
specification." 17
This indorsement or annexing, in fact, was a requirement estab-
lished by rule of court in the case of any "deed, note, open
account, or other writing." 18
(b) By informal rule of court adopted in 1801,11 the defend-
ant was required to make his defense at the sitting of court to
which the process was returnable. This did not exclude a con-
tinuance for good cause, but denied to the defendant the right
which he had in the ordinary procedure of imparling to the
second court as a matter of course. 20
(c) As regards the defendant's allegations, it would appear
that at the outset this form of proceeding was one "where all the
pleadings were ore tenus, and where parties were heard on
both sides, without reducing them to legal form." 21 Notwith-
standing that in 1801 the court had unmistakably called for writ-
ing in this regard,2 2 it seems to have been the general usage of
the bar down to 1828 "to dispense with formal pleas." 23 But
in that year came a pronouncement to the effect that, under the
act, a written plea, unless waived by agreement of the parties,
was necessary to permit evidence of a special defense.
"The same necessity," it was said, "exists as well in this as in
the higher jurisdiction of the Court, for appraising the plaintiff
of the grounds of the defense, and when that defense consists of a
matter pleadable at law, I cannot conceive of any forms more
convenient or appropriate than those established by the practice
of the Courts: And if a case should occur in which these would
not apply, and that might well happen, as this is a species of
equity jurisdiction, something in the form of an answer would
be admissible." 24
17 See Parker v. Martin, 1 Bail. 138, 139 (S. C. 1828). "If the party in
a short way state his claim to demand money, as a debt, or as a compensa-
tion for an injury, and enough appears to apprise the party of the matter
to which he is called to answer, it is generally sufficient." Caldwell v.
Langford, 1 McM. 275, 277-278 (S. C. 1841). But of. McDaniel v. Scoggins,
2 Mill 227 (S. C. 1818).
1s Rules of May 7, 1814, No. xxxvii, in 1 Mill xviii (S. C. 1817) ; Hagood
v. Mitchell, 1 Bail. 124 (S. C. 1828); Parker v. Martin, supra note 17.19 Strange v. Evans, 2 Bay 327 (S. C. 1801).
201bid.; Hughes v. Phelps, supra note 14.
21 Argument of counsel for plaintiff in Strange v. Evans, supra note 19.
22 Hughes v. Phelps, supra note 14. But it is also said here that "it
never was customary to make up any pleadings on summary process"
(meaning formal pleadings). Ibid. 82.
-3 See Bailey v. Wilson, 1 Bail. 15, 17 (S. C. 1828).
24Ibid. 17, per Johnson, J.
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(d) Where a jury was demanded, the court, instead of wait-
ing until the parties had arrived at an issue as in the ordinary
course of pleading, exercised, under the terms of the act, the
power of immediately ordering issue to be joined. In keeping
with what has been said above,
"this issue need not be a formal issue, in every respect con-
formable to the pleading in other cases, but a plain simple denial
or plea in writing etc.; for the judges are authorized to make
all necessary rules and orders for promoting the design of the
legislature in passing this act." 25
(e) Pursuant to the act, the trial was by the court without a
jury, unless a jury was demanded. It appears, however, that
the right to a jury was rarely taken advantage of?° To this
result may have contributed the rule laid down in 1797 that
in this form of proceeding the party electing to demand a jury
was "bound by their decision or verdict, as much as he would
have been bound by an award of arbitrators, against whom no
misconduct could be alleged." 2 7
(f) A particularly strildng feature of this procedure was the
provision made for the examination of the parties by means of
written interrogatories. In Dillon v. McCne,2- decided in 1800, it
was said that, when common law rules of evidence fail, "the
parties may then resolt to equitable principles to supply the de-
fects of the common law; that where there is no evidence to be
procured, the defendant has a right to call upon the plaintiff to
answer on oath, touching any matter known only to the parties
themselves; and if the plaintiff refuses to answer, then to take
the matter pro confesso, or to move for a non-suit ;" and that, for
this purpose, the plaintiff ought to give the defendant a written
notice specifying the points as to which answer was sought. This
direction, by 1814, at the latest, had grown into a formal rule of
court, in terms applicable to both parties:
"If the plaintiff in an action by summary process shall desire
to have the benefit of defendant's oath, he shall state, in writing,
the points to which he shall require his oath, and serve him
with a copy thereof, with notice of such his intention, at least
one day before the hearing of the cause; and defendant may
either give his answer in writing, to be sworn to before the
clerk, or ore tenu.s in open court; and if a defendant shall desire
the benefit of the plaintiffs oath, he shall proceed to require it
in the same manner." 29
25 Hughes v. Phelps, supra note 14, at 82.
211Reporter's note to "Process summary," 2 Bay at p. 585; argument of
counsel for plaintiff in Strange v. Evans, supra note 19, at 327.
27 See James v. O'Driscoll, 2 Bay 101, 103 (S. C. 1797).
282 Bay 280 (S. C. 1800).
29Rule XXXVI of May 7, 1814. 1 Mill xvii-xviii (S. C. 1819).
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Authority for the practice in question appears to have been
found in the clause of the act giving the party "the benefit of
all matters" as if the suit had been commenced in equity 0
Moreover, -it is not at all unlikely that Blackstone's quite re-
markable criticism of the lack of means of discovery in common
law causes 1 had something to do with the result. But as to
the form of discovery, there was obviously a wide departure
from current equity practice. At the time in question that prac-
tice knew no such thing as interrogatories apart from the bill
or as the reciprocal right of the defendant to discovery, other-
wise than by means of a cross bill. This method of discovery
is familiar enough to us today, but it was not until 1852, under
the Chancery Practice Amendment Act of that year, that it was
introduced in England 32 and not until the Rules of 1912 that
it passed into the equity practice of the Federal Courts. There
is good reason, therefore, for believing that we have here the
first instance in Anglo-American procedural history, not only
of discovery grantable in common law actions, but also of the
separate interrogatory, open alike to plaintiff and defendant, as
the particular mechanism of discovery. What suggested the
adoption of this form, other than its simplicity, we have no
means of knowing. In view, however, of the French Huguenot
element among the cultured classes of South Carolina, there
is room for the conjecture that it was influenced by the French
institution of interrogatoires sur faits et articles. Both under
the Ordinance of 1667 33 and the Code of 1806,14 this was a
means whereby either party was entitled to demand the answer
of the other to the points of fact articulated by the former in
writing; like its progenitor, the Romano-canonical positions, it
was entirely disconnected from the pleadings; and the interroga-
tories, pursuant to order of court, were served upon the party
sought to be questioned, who at an appointed time appeared
and answered them before the court or a delegated judge. While
the present proceeding is simpler, the rule of court concerning
it might well have been drafted in the light of the French
practice.
Following the view taken in Dillon v. McCue, it was at
the outset uniformly held that the right to compel an op-
ponent's answers to interrogatories was conditioned upon the
party's inability to prove his case in any other manner.33 Later,
30 Holly v. Thurston, 1 Rice 282 (S. C. 1839).
a' 3 BL. Comm.* 382.
32As to the precise manner of introduction under this act, see Langdoll,
Discovery Under the Judicature Acts, 1873, 1875 (1898) 12 HARv. L. Rav.
151, 165 et seq.
83 Ordonnance civile, tift. X.
3 Code de Procedure Civile, Art. 324-336.
35 Brown v. Collins, 2 Bay 326 (S. C. 1801); Addison v. White, 2 Mill
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this doctrine was discarded and the answers placed upon an
unconditional basis.30 Nevertheless, as it appears to have been
conceived that the right to the equitable means of proof pre-
supposed a default of common law means, the idea persisted that
the party, in resorting to interrogatories, was in effect saying
that he could not otherwise prove his case. As a result, while
the party remained free to interrogate his opponent without any
preliminary showing,- and to offer or not offer the answers in
evidence, 38 the rule was that if he did offer the answers, result-
ing from an examination of the opponent upon the whole case,
he was not permitted to introduce any other evidence-2 Inas-
much as in making the answers, the defendant was not a wit-
ness, no cross-interrogatories were permitted, and when the
answers were made orally there was no cross-examination.3
Failure to answer might result in a decree pro con fesso or a
non-suit as the case required.4' Allowance made for its peculiari-
ties, the proceeding was governed by ordinary equity principles,
since "the rule of Court was intended to assimilate these cases
369 (S. C. 1818); Wallace v. Norvell, 1 Bail. 125 (S. C. 182); but see
Walker v. Mathaney, Harp. 187 (S. C. 1824).
so Roche v. Chaplin, 1 Bail. 419 (S. C. 1O0); Toomer v. Righton, Riley
263 (S. C. 1837); Brown v. Stroud, 8 Rich. L. 292 (S. C. 1855).
37Brown v. Stroud, supra note 36.38 Henken v. Gramann, 2 Rich. L. 365 (S. C. 1846).
39 Brown v. Stroud, supra note 36; Harrison v. Dodson, 11 Rich. L. 4&
(S. C. 1857). In the latter case it is said that the proceeding is "exactly
analogous to a bill for discovery, as ancillary to another suit." But the
analogy fails to support the result reached, because, under such a bill,
the plaintiff is entitled to the discovery, even "if it be merely cumulative
evidence of material facts." STORY, EQuITY PxL=INGS (10th cd. 1892)
§ 324, and note to § 320. In a previous case, Henken v. Gramann, avpn.
note 38, at 367, the court with more correctness had recognized that the
plaintiff, under the equity practice, was confined to the use of the de-
fendant's answer only where the jurisdiction of the court was invoked
to decide a purely legal claim on the ground that the facts ncceszry
to its establishment were exclusively within the knowledge of the de-
fendant [Russell v. Clark's Executors, 7 Cranch 69, 89 (U. S. 1812)]
and that the jurisdiction of the court in the summary process "did not
at all depend upon discovery." But the court in the same case fore-
shadows the rule later established by saying, "If they had offered the
answers, they might, perhaps, have been considered as having admitted
that they had no other sufficient evidence upon the matters concerning
which they had interrogated the defendants, and so, from analogy to
equity practice, they might have been prevented from contradicting the
defendants whom they had made their witnesses." The analogy here
attempted seems as objectionable as the former, and certainly the refer-
ence to the interrogated defendants as witnesses mistakes their true
character.
- Hill v. Denny, 1 Strob. 338 (S. C. 1847).
41 Dillon v. McCue, supra note 28; Walker v. Mathaney, cupra note 35;
Fullmore v. Cockfield, 2 Bail. 446 (S. C. 1831).
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to the practice in Chancery" 42 and "there is nothing in the rule
which favors the idea that the discovery to be obtained under
it can be demanded in a case where the Court of Equity would
refuse it." 43
(g) It is clear that, under the construction given the act, the
court, where occasion required, was accustomed to apply sub-
stantive equity principles in common law causes. Though the
reported cases do not disclose any specific instance of this ad-
ministration, there is plenty of evidence of its existence. Said
counsel for the plaintiff in Cadh v. Lyle 1807: 4
"This mode of proceeding is conformable to the proceedings
in courts of equity * * : and under the summary jurisdiction
of the Court of Common Pleas, the equity of cases is considered
as well as their legal merits; and decrees are often founded upon
the equity of the causes in which they are given." 4,
It is judicially taken "for granted that the district court
in the exercise of its summary jurisdiction, on petition and
process, may decide according to the rules which prevail in
equity," that is to say, "when there is some equitable matter
brought into the view of the court." 41 So, also, there is judicial
reference to the process as "a new mode of proceeding, cor-
responding with the proceedings in equity or at law, as the par-
ticular circumstances of the case may require," 4" as "a species
of equity jurisdiction," 48 as "an equitable proceeding," 41 as a
"quasi equity jurisdiction." 50 And there is unmistakable recog-
nition that it was open to the defendant to plead an equitable
defense.5 ' On the other hand, it is clear that the jurisdiction
was not concurrent with that of the court of equity: an attempt
made in 1821, by means of the summary process, to charge the
separate estate of a wife, in the hands of her husband as trustee,
with a debt which the former had incurred for the benefit of
the separate estate, was met with the answer that the juris-
,diction, under the terms of the act, extended only to "causes
-cognizable in the said Courts," that is to say, to the common law
42 Clark v. Meek, 2 Bail. 391 (S. C. 1831).
-3 Holly v. Thurston, 1 Rice 282 (S. C. 1839).
44 2 Brev. 183 (S. C. 1807).
45 In the reporter's note to "Process summary," in the index to 2 Bay
at p. 585, it is said that in the summary process "the parties have all the
advantages of law and equity" and that frequently there will be found "the
principles of both jurisdictions, in those small cases, blended together."
46 Harman v. Counts, 2 Brev. 476 (S. C. 1811).
47 Taylor v. Drake, I McCord 174 (S. C. 1821).
48 Bailey v. Wilson, supra note 23.
49 Goodson v. Oliver, 2 Bail. 446 (S. C. 1831).
5o Lewis v. Kemp, 6 Rich. L. 515 (S. C. 1832).
51 Baildy v. Wilson, supra note 23.
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causes constituting the jurisdictional field of the court of Com-
mon Pleaszl2
(h) The final judgment was known as a "decree."
"The practice under the act has been for decrees to be pro-
nounced in open court, viva voce, by the presiding magistrate,
which are recorded in the clerk's book of the minutes of the
proceedings of the court; and no other kind of decrees or judg-
ments are usually given." &3
This record was the only one made, there being no expansion
of it into a formal order.
"The minute of the judgment, or decree, made at the time
that it is given in court, is the record of such judgment or
decree and, though brief and informal, is a sufficient record
to authorize the issuing of execution thereon." ''
(i) Employment of the proceeding was optional with the
plaintiff. He might, instead, bring his suit in the ordinary form.-
But, in the absence of good reason for so doing, he was then
entitled, in the event of success, to no more than the reduced
costs of this form.
"Where one sues in the general jurisdiction, and offers no
proof whatever of a sum beyond the limited jurisdiction, or
where it appears, obviously, that the suit has been instituted
wantonly, upon a fictitious demand, with a view to increase
the costs, he shall recover only the costs allowed on summary
process." u6
So regulated, the summary process was a conspicuous feature
of South Carolina judicature for nearly a century. It came to
an end in the unhappy days of Reconstruction, being super-
seded through the adoption in 1870 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, modeled upon that of New York. The last reported
case in which it was employed appears to be Goggans v. Tur'nip-
seed decided in 1868.57 Perhaps the benefits which it conferred
have been realized quite as well under the provisions of the Code.
Nevertheless, had the reform of civil procedure in South Caro-
lina taken place under different conditions, it is certain that the
change would have been less revolutionary, and the probability
52 Taylor v. Drake, supra note 47.
Z3 Witherspoon, counsel, in Cash v. Lyle, supra note 44.
Per Trezevant, J., in Cash v. Lyle, supra note 44, at 185. See a]so
Foster v. Chapman, 4 McCord 291 (S. C. 1827).
55 Trowell v. Youmans, 5 Strob. 67 (S. C. 1850).
5 Furman v. Peay, 2 Bail. 612 (S. C. 1832) ; Nance v. Palmer, 2 Bail.
88 (S. C. 1831); Cambridge Association v. Nichols, 1 Treadw. 121 (.
C. 1812).
57 1 S. C. 80 (1868).
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is that some traces of the old proceeding would have been per-
mitted to survive.
That proceeding deserves to occupy a notable place in the
history of American civil justice. It constituted a courageous
departure from traditional institutions, skillfully conducted and
successfully accomplished. Its simple petition as a substitute
for summons and declaration; its lack of emphasis upon the
distinction between forms of action; its flexible requirements
with respect to the defendant's pleading; its bestowal upon, the
court of power to direct an issue in jury cases; its accentuation
of trial by the court without the intervention of a jury-all these
represent ideas that we are accustomed to think of as belong-
ing to a later day. So, too, the possibility which it afforded
of applying equitable principles in common law actions, with
its incident recognition of equitable defenses, and the introduc-
tion on its part of a competent system of discovery in these
same actions, were long in advance of any other Anglo-American
legislation on the subject.
II
THE KENTUCKY PROCEEDING BY PETITION AND SUMMONS OF 1805
We now turn to another example of the same kind of legisla-
tion, one of narrower compass and less adequate principles,
which, nevertheless, found acceptance in a much larger terri-
torial area. This originated in the Kentucky statute of Decem-
ber 26, 1805, entitled "An Act providing a summary mode of
recovering debts." 58 It was here provided that
"when any person holding a bond or note for the direct pay-
ment of money, shall desire to put the same in suit, he may do
so by filing it with the clerk of any circuit court holding juris-
diction thereof, together with a petition purporting as follows:
.'F. circuit, sct. A. B. plaintiff, states that he holds a bond or
note (as the case may be) on the defendant C. D. in substance
as followeth (here insert a copy of the bond or note) ; yet the
said debt remains unpaid; wherefore he prays judgment for his
debt, and damages for the detention of the same, together with
his costs, etc.'" 59
If the plaintiff held as indorsee, he was to attend the setting
forth of the instrument with the statement:
"On which is the following assignment or assignments (re-
citing these) whereby the plaintiff hath become the proprietor
thereof, of which the defendant hath had due notice." 00
58 3 LITTELL, STATUTE LAW OF KENTUCKY (1811) 319-21.
59 Act of December 26, 1805 § 1..
60 Ibid. § 2.
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Further provisions of the act were that "a copy of the peti-
tion shall be sent out with a summons annexed thereto, requir-
ing the defendant or defendants to appear and answer the said
demand, on the third day of the succeeding term;" that service
was to be effected by the sheriff delivering a copy of the peti-
tion and summons to the defendant; "I that the "petition and
summons shall not go to the rules, but the proceedings shall be
in court, and shall be docketed to the third day;" c that the
petition "shall stand in place of a declaration" and "an issue
may be joined as in an action of debt, on such a bond or note ;" 0
and that the employment of this proceeding, rather than the
ordinary form, was to be optional with the plaintiff.c6
"The evident object of the law," said the Court of Appeals in
1816, "was to give, in cases where there was a bond or note for
the direct payment of money, a more speedy remedy than was
then afforded by the tardy mode of proceeding at law; and the
remedy was given in those cases only, because the bond or note
furnished intrinsic evidence of the debt; and there was not as
likely in such cases as in others to exist any extraneous matter
of defense." 63
And it is also evident that, by providing the exact form of words
to be used in the petition, the legislature intended, for the same
reason, to furnish a means whereby the litigant could commence
his own suit, without the aid of counsel.c"
The proceeding as thus established experienced later two statu-
tory modifications. In 1827 it ceased to be necessary to serve
the defendant with a copy of the petition, service by summons
alone being made sufficient; 67 and in 1837 the particular pro-
vision concerning expedited trial was displaced by the require-
ment, applicable also to actions of debt on records and specialties,
that the suit be "docketed for the first day of the term,
and stand for trial on said day; but if defence be made, the
61 Ibid. § 3.
62 Ibid. § 4.
63 Ibid. § 6.
64 Ibid. § 8.
63 Kentucky Insurance Co. v. Hawkins, 4 Bibb 470 (Ky. 1816).
66 Cf. in this regard the Tennessee statute of Nov. 20, 1811, providing
that the plaintiff or defendant may enter his "own plea, and defend his,
her or their own cause, and if the cause of action is founded on a specialty,
note or liquidated account (signed by the parties) no declaration ehall
be required of the plaintiff, but the suit shall be tried in a summary
way without pleading in writing, and no instrument of writing chall be
lost or destroyed for want of form, if it contains sufficient substance,
any law to the contrary notwithstanding. Providcd, Nothing herein con-
tained shall be so construed as to prevent any defendant to file his pleas
in writing either by himself or attorney." Acts of 1811, c. 114. 2
TENN. LAws (Scott, 1821) 71.
7Acts of 1826-1827, 126; Gearhart v. Olmstead, 7 Dana 441 (Ky. 1833).
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case shall stand for trial on the second day of the court, as
though set for trial on that day." 08
In the construction placed upon the act by the Court of
Appeals there was a fair furtherance of its objects. Thus, in
a suit against a corporation it was said with reference to the
statutory words, "the plaintiff holds a note on the Newport
Manufacturing Company," that
"this comprehensive allegation-as in other cases of petition
on notes-imports every fact (consistent with the tenor of the
writing) that is necessary to show that the note is genuine, and
binding 'on' the defendant." 69
It was held that the proceeding lay against executors on their
testator's instrument,70 lay in favor of a corporation 1 and per-
mitted of the joining in suit of a number of notes "2-conclusions
which too ritualistic an observance of the statutory form of peti-
tion would have denied; that it lay also where the note was
written in a foreign language; 3 and that a paper stating that
the defendant had "borrowed" from the agent of the plaintiff
a specified sum was a note within the meaning of the statute.7'
On the other hand, it was insisted that the petition on its face
disclose a cause of action.75 Moreover, "where the obligation
to pay accrues upon the happening of a contingency, depends
upon a condition to be performed by the plaintiff, or any like
matter" requiring to be specially alleged, then the proceeding
could not be maintained, since the statute left no room for any
such allegation. As this doctrine was otherwise expressed,
"the statute authorizes such remedy only where the writing
is evidence, so directly and unequivocally on its face, of a debt
due in money, as that no averment is necessary to show that
the plaintiff is entitled to the debt demanded." 7T
68Acts of 1836-37, 279.
6 See Commercial Bank v. Newport Mfg. Co., 1 B. Mon. 13, 16 (Ky.
1840).
10 Moore's Executors v. Gwathmey, 2 Bibb 334 (Ky. 1811); Moore's Ex-
ecutoks v. Russell, 2 Bibb 443 (Ky. 1811).1Kentucky Insurance Co. v. Hawkins, supra note 65.
72Bliss v. Branham, 1 J. J. Marsh. 200 (Ky. 1829).
73 Hartman v. Welz, 1 B. Mon. 242 (Ky. 1841).
74 Harrow v. Dugan, 6 Dana 341 (Ky. 1838).7SKincaid v. Higgins, 1 Bibb 352 (Ky. 1809); Brittenham v. Cummins,
1 Bibb 487 (Ky. 1809).
7e Kincaid v. Higgins, supra note 75.
77 See Pool v. McCaughan, 6 T. B. Mon. 335, 336 (Ky. 1827).
In 1837 an act was passed rendering this proceeding applicable to suits
against the drawers, indorsers and acceptors of bills of exchange and
making these parties thus answerable jointly and severally to the holders.
A new form of petition was prescribed, applicable to this situation, but,
evidently in view of the doctrine above noted, it was also provided that
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Nevertheless, the court seems to have been quite liberal in dis-
pensing with the necessity of such an averment. Thus it coun-
tenanced the proceeding in one case where one of tw-o joint
obligors had died prior to suit and recovery was sought from
the survivor, and, in another, where a number of persons were
sued as members of a partnership on a note 'signed "Castleman
& Co." " To be sure, in the former of these cases, the court
took the view that no averment would have been required even
in a common law declaration, but this seems rather a twisting
of the orthodox rule for the purpose in hand. Again, where
the note sued on read: "Due F. K. one hundred thirty-nine
pounds one shilling, the freight to be deducted out of it," it
was held that the deduction was a matter of defense, not requir-
ing notice in the petition.80 And, finally, we encounter the hold-
ing that a replevin bond is an instrument for the direct payment
of money and will support the proceeding."1 The ground of the
last result does not appear, but certainly there might here be
invoked the analogy of the earlier practice at common law in
which the declaration counted only upon the so-called "money
part" of the bond, leaving the condition to be developed of record
by the defendant. But, when it came to the matter of the
medium of payment called for by the obligation, the court at
all times preserved a stricter attitude. Since the statute allowed
the proceeding only in case of instruments for the payment of
money, nothing short of lawful money of the United States would
satisfy this requirement.82 Nor was the proceeding recognized
as proper where the undertaking was to pay money or some-
thing else, in the alternative, -3 or even to pay money plus some-
thing else.8 Taken as a whole, however, it must be said that
"the plaintiff may make any averment at the bottom of the pctition,
which he shall deem necessary to sustain his case." Acts of 1836-37, 41-41.
The same Act created a like joint and several liability, enforcible by
this remedy, under a prescribed form of petition (which, also, was sub-
ject to the last mentioned provision) in favor of "any bank incorporated
by this Commonwealth, who shall hold a promissory note, negotiable and
payable at any incorporated bank, and discounted by the bank holding
the same, or * * any indorser who shall have taken up any such dis-
counted note," and "against the drawers and previous indorzers."
7SVaughn v. Halstead, 4 Bibb 468 (Ky. 1816).
79 Kinsman v. Castleman, 1 T. B. Mon. 210 (Ky. 1824).
s' Kalfus v. Watts, Litt. Sel. Cas. 197 (Ky. 1814).
sl Sanders v. Outten, 1 J. J. Marsh. 488 (Ky. 1829).
S2 Chambers v. George, 5 Litt. 335 (Ky. 1824); Fleming v. Campbell,
1 J. J. Marsh. 499 (Ky. 1829).
83 Louden v. Kenney, 1 Bibb 330 (Ky. 1809); Townsend v. Burgher,
'7 T. B. Mlon. 224 (Ky. 1828).
84 Wright v. Coleman, 4 Bibb 252 (Ky. 1815).
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the decisions display a comparatively generous attitude toward
the act and its purposes.8 5
It will be seen that the variation from the ordinary procedure
presented by the remedy in question .consisted first, in the
simpler and ready-made manner of pleading the claim and com-
mencing the suit; secondly, in the possibility of a speedier trial.
As regards the defendant's pleadings, however, and the further
steps in the cause .there was no dispensation from the rules
applicable to common' law causes in general. Yet with these
modest advantages, the proceeding seems to have proved a highly
popular one. The reported decisions of the Court of Appeals
down to the 10th B. Monroe (1850) show its constant employ-
ment, and in Moorehead's work on Kentucky civil practice, pub-
lished in 1846,88 some fifteen pages are devoted to its treatment.
It disappeared only with the general reform of civil procedure
inaugurated by the Code of Practice of 1851.
But the proceeding found adoption beyond the borders of Ken-
tucky. It appeared in sundry other jurisdictions, usually with
slight variations from the Kentucky model. The first of these
seems to have been Alabama, which established the proceeding
by Act of December 20, 1820.87 Here, for the Kentucky direc-
tion as to expedited trial, there is substituted the less urgent
provision that the issue joined "shall stand over to, and be tried
at, the next term of the court * " * unless a trial is had at the
first term by consent of the parties." 88 If the Supreme Court
reports are any criterion, the proceeding was not highly favored
in this State; only some half dozen cases are there identifiable
as having been brought in this form.8s Nevertheless, it con-
tinued to be available until the taking effect of the Code of 1852.
Missouri was the next state to follow the Kentucky example,
this by Act of January 17, 1825.00 The latter was a close copy
of the original statute with two additions: n (1) the remedy
was made to apply to bonds or notes "for the direct payment
85 For other decisions see MOOREHEAD, PRACTICE IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND
PROCEEDINGS AT LAW IN KENTUCKY (1846) 524 et seq.
80 The work last cited.
87 Sections 1-5, 12 of "An act to regulate the proceedings in suits at
common law." TOULmIN, DIGEST OF THE LAivs OF ALABAIMIA (1823) 478
et seq.
88 Act of December 20, 1820, § 5.
89 Brahan v. Collins, Min. 169 (Ala. 1823); Gilbert v. Lane, 3 Port.
267 (Ala. 1836); Norwood v. Riddle, 9 Port. 425 (Ala. 1839); Ilounshell
v. Phares, 1 Ala. 580 (1840); Ice v. Manning, 3 Ala. 121 (1841); O'Neal
v. Garrett, 3 Ala. 276 (1842).
90 "An Act simplifying proceedings at law for the collection of debts."1
2 DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF MISSOURI (1825) 620-21.
91 It contained also the insignificant variation that the proceedings wero
to be docketed to the second, instead of the third day of the term.
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of 'property or money;" (2) provision was made holding the
defendant to bail by means of a capias-which could not be done
under the Kentucky act 2 Ten years later this legislation was
re-enacted in a form giving evidence of much more skillful
draftsmanship than the original. Retaining the extension of
the remedy to cases where the medium of payment is property,
this Act of 1835 93 calls the proceeding a "petition in debt."
Under its provisions service is effected by summons, without a
copy of the petition, or by capias; the defendant, as a rule, is
to plead on or before the second day of the term and "suit in
such cases shall be determined at the same term, unless con-
tinued for good cause."
The course of decisions under these Missouri acts exhibits
no radical difference from that in Kentucky. There was at
first some confusion as to the possibility of adding to the staht-
tory form. Thus, it was held that an administrator could not
sue in this form without an allegation showing his right,"' and
similarly that, in the case of a note signed in a partnership
name, there must be an averment identifying the defendants
as the persons who composed the partnership. On the other
hand, where a petition filed by an administrator set forth a note
bearing date after the date of his letters, whereof profert had
been made, it was said that "the form prescribed by the act
precludes the plaintiff from making any statement of the true
time when the instrument was executed," but that, as he might
be able to explain the inconsistency,
"whatever he might have been required to state in a declara-
tion at common law that is incompatible with this statutory
mode of proceeding, he must be allowed to prove on the trial,
if the defendant by his plea elect to put it in issue." 01
Later, there was an express recession from the cases incon-
sistent with the last mentioned, this in a suit against a partner-
ship, where the court said that
"the statement in the petition, that the plaintiffs are the
legal owners of the note or bond, includes the averment that
the note set out was executed to the plaintiffs by the partner-
ship name." 7
12 Colyer v. Witaker, 2 A. K. Marsh. 197 (Ky. 1S20).
93 "An act for the speedy recovery of debts due on bonds and notc,"
approved March 14, 1835. Mo. REy. STAT. (1835) 449.
94 McGill v. Leduc, 3 Mo. 398 (1S34) ; Bailey v. Ormsby, 3 Mo. 580 (1834).
95 Tabor v. Jameson, 5 Mo. 495 (1838) ; Dyer v. Sublette, 6 Mo. 14 (1839).
16 Hamilton v. Stewart, 5 Mo. 266, 268 (1838).
97 Woods v. Hunt, 6 Mlo. 163, 164 (1839). To the same effect is Middle-
ton v. Atkins,,7 Mo. 184 (1841).
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There thus came to be unqualified acceptance of the Kentucky
doctrine that the petition did not admit of "averment." Il More-
over, the same significance as in Kentucky was attached to the
words "direct payment," it being held as there that the proceed-
ing could not be maintained on a note by which the defendant
undertook to do certain acts in addition to the payment of
money.99
The flourishing period of the proceeding in Missouri is that
covered by Volumes 2 to 7 of the Missouri Reports, that is to
say, between 1827 and 1842. During the remainder of its life,
which ended with the adoption of the Code of 1849, it seems
to have been seldom resorted to.
Illinois, in its turn, succumbed to the attractions of the pro-
ceeding, adopting it by Act of February 25, 1833.00 This statute
:s an almost exact reproduction of the Missouri act of 1825, in-
cluding the direction that the suit shall not "go to the rules,"
-a regulation which was probably never appropriate to the
Illinois practice. For this reason, in all likelihood, the direction
in question was omitted in the Revised Statutes of 1845,11 where
the act appears without any provision concerning expedited
trial. A decision in 1839102 evidences that the Supreme Court
was alive to the origin and purposes of the proceeding. Said the
court, per Browne, J.,
"They have a statute in Kentucky very similar to ours, which
has always been liberally construed by their courts. It seems to
me one of the objects of the statute was to enable any person to
bring his own suit. I am strengthened in this opinion from the
circumstance of the form of the petition being laid down in the
statute. The statute is intended to give a more speedy remedy
than was afforded by proceedings at law."
Despite this good beginning, it can hardly be said that the court,
in the upshot, was disposed to view the proceeding with a very
frendly eye, since of some six cases in which questions relating to
this form were dealt with, two disclose a reversal of the lower
court's judgment on the ground that the verdict and judgment
were in-terms of damages instead of debt.103 The proceeding, here,
98 Curle v. McNutt, 6 Mo. 495, 496 (1840).
99 Curle v. Pettus, 6 Mo. 497 (1840); see, however, Casey v. Barcroft,
5 Mo. 128 (1838).
100 GALE, PUBLIC AND GENERAL STATUTE LAWs OF ILLINOIS '(1839) 538-
539.
201 ILL. REV. STAT. (1845), c. 83, §§ 33-37.
102 Evans v. Landon, 3 Ill. 53 (1839).
103 Jackson v. Haskell, 3 Ill. 565 (1840) ; Heyl v. Stapp, 4 Il. 96 (1841).
The other cases referred to besides Evans v. Landon, supra note 102, are
Duncan v. McAffee, 3 Ill. 559 (1840); MeConnel v. Thomas, 3 Ill. 313
(1840), and Douglas v. Whiting, 28 Ill. 362 (1862), the last being an
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enjoyed nothing like the vogue it had attained in Kentucky and
Missouri, and the act seemingly had become virtually a dead let-
ter long before it was dropped from the statute-book in the re-
vision of 1874.
Another state to borrow the proceeding was Arkumz as. The
statute giving place to it, approved November 29, 1337, was
evidently modeled on the revised Missouri act of 1335. It ex-
hibits, however, some differences in detail. The remedy is made
applicable to any "bill," as well as to notes and bonds, "for
the direct payment of money or property ;" a copy of the instru-
ment and assignments, instead of the originals, is to be filed
with the petition; and apparently in view of the earlier Blis-
souri decisions, with reference to suits by personal representa-
tives, two sections are interpolated authorizing the use of the
remedy by executors and administrators and providing a separ-
ate form of petition for this case. No expedition of trial is
contemplated, it being declared that the suit "shall be prose-
cuted to final judgment and execution in the same manner as
if it had been commenced in the ordinary form." ' In one of
the first cases of the proceeding which came before the
Supreme Court, it is curious to note that counsel for the plain-
tiff, while arguing for the sufficiency of the petition, took occa-
sion to ventilate their private opinion of the institution in
question, by observing that
"we regard the whole matter of petition and summons as a
useless and pernicious innovation on established forms and as
calculated more frequently to thwart than to forward justice." U5
As to the decisions themselves, there deserves to be mentioned
the virtual nullification of the act so far as relates to instru-
ments payable in property. This occurred in Mitchell I,. We-
ker (1842) 1o1 where suit had been brought upon a note "to be paid
in Arkansas State Bank paper." The court held that the proceed-
ing could not be maintained, because what the statute provided
was a summary mode of recovery in an action of debt, and debt
at common law would not lie upon an instrument of the present
kind. That the action was one in debt was of course correct, as
had been conceded in other jurisdictions, but apparently it never
occurred to the court that it was open to the legislature to en-
large the compass of the action of debt, and that this had actually
action of ejectment involving a collateral review of proceedings by petition
and summons instituted in 1857.
04 ARK. REv. STAT. (1837).152-153.
'Q5 Dudley v. Smith, 2 Ark. 365, 367 (1840). This observation in all
likelihood proceeded from the picturesque Albert Pike, as Pike and Sutton
are mentioned as counsel for the plaintiff.
0o6 4 Ark. 145 (1842).
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been Otone in the present instance by the express extension of
the remedy to instruments payable in property. We may note
also the insistence upon the doctrine forbidding addition to the
statutory form. "The statute," it is said in Thompson W.
Shreve (1866)107 "admits of no material averments other than
those, in substance, which it prescribes." The cases relating to
the remedy occur from the 2d down to the 25th volume of Ar-
kansas Reports and, from their respectable number, would argue
that it was in fairly common use. Certainly, it had not been in
any sense laid aside prior to its supersession by the Code of
Practice in Civil Cases enacted in 1868.
Some two years after Arkansas had received it, the institution
in question was introduced in the then territory of Iowa. Here
it formed the subject of certain sections in the Act of January
25, 1839.108 These appear to have been based upon the Illinois
act or the Missouri Act of 1825, as like either, they follow the
Kentucky phraseology, but contemplate an instrument payable in
property as well as one payable in money. They contain no
special provision looking to expedition of trial. Since the gen-
eral reform of civil procedure in this jurisdiction took place in
1851, through the adoption of the Code of that year, our pro-
ceeding had here a short lease of life. In the single case in which
it came to the attention of the Supreme Court--Jacobson v. Man-
ning, decided in 1850 'O9-- the court treats it with respect but
seems rather to apologize for doing so, saying that
"when the proceeding under the statute '" :: " is adopted
by a plaintiff, if he proceed in the manner and form thereby
prescribed, he must be sustained by the courts, however sub-
versive of the common law the procedure may be."
Finally, the proceeding made its appearance in Kansas, being
taken over by the territorial legislature in 1855.110 The Kansas
provisions seem to have come from the revised Missouri statute
of 1835 and include the same adjustment of the matter of ex-
pedition of trial. But here the career of the proceeding was
even briefer than in Iowa, terminating with the adoption in
1859 of the Code of Civil Procedure, transplanted from Ohio.",
The one volume of published reports (McCahon's) dealing with
the territorial period contains no instance of any resort to the
statute.
The spread of the legislation in question from the State of
its origin, so far as regards its installation in Alabama, Mis-
107 24 Ark. 261, 263 (1866).
108 STATUTE LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF IOWA (1839) 380-381.
109 2 G. Greene 585 (Iowa 1850).
110 STATUTES OF THE TERRITORY OF KANSAS (1855) 140-141.
1i3 As to the origin of the Kansas Code, see HEPBURN, HISTORIcAL DE-
VELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING (1897) 104.
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souri and Illinois, is probably accounted for by the emigration
from Kentucky into these newer lands.112 In Arkansas, Iowa
and Kansas, its advent, in all likelihood, was due to a less senti-
mental belief in its supposed advantages. But, after all, these
were largely an illusion. The principal attraction of the proceed-
ing lay in the ad captaoidnL appeal made by its set form of peti-
tion, which invited the litigant to be his own lawyer. It did,
indeed, endeavor to bring about a somewhat speedier trial than
under the ordinary practice, but this was not everywhere true,
and it is to be doubted whether it anywhere met with unquali-
fied success in this regard. As against these slender merits, this
same set form of petition rendered the proceeding a formalistic
institution without the least possibility of adaptation to a situa-
tion at all out of the common run-an inflexible category into
which the plaintiff had to fit his claim on pain of retracing his
steps: in short, what we have here is a reproduction in miniature
of the common law. idea of form of action at the most rigid
period of its history. Moreover, there was no attempt to ame-
liorate the emsting procedure with respect to the later pleadings.
The defendant was held to the ordinary rules applicable to an
action of debt. If the instrument sued on were not under seal,
nil debet would suffice for most defenses; but, if the contrary
were the case, then he was required to plead his defenses
specially. By the same token, we can well imagine that a plain-
tiff suing in propria perso2w, would find his difficulties only be-
ginning with the coming in of the defendant's plea. The pro-
ceeding had none of the virtues of the South Carolina summary
process. On the whole, it cannot be regarded as other than a
well intended effort at reform, which lacked scientific value and
had no claim to permanence.
III
THE VIRGINIA PROCEEDING BY NOTICE AND MOTION OF 1849
A summary proceeding by motion for judgment based upon
informal notice to the defendant, and applicable to particular
situations especially calling for promptness of dispatch is to be
found in numerous jurisdictions. It is, however, in certain of
the Southern States-notably Virginia, West Virginia, Ken-
tucky, Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi-that the remedy has
been more extensively used. A curious manifestation of this
practice was the employment of the so-called "bank notice," in
the earlier years of Alabama and M1ississippi. 1 3 This came about
2 In Curle v. McNutt, srpra note 98, at 497, the court u.prezes its
respect for the decisions of Kentucky "on a statute which we have every
reason to believe was, as it were, transplanted from that State into this,
for much the greater part of our population migrated thence."
11 See Logwood v. Planter's Bank, BIin. 23 (Ala. 1820); Duncan v.
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from the action of the legislature in including in bank charters
-as regards the former of these states apparently a usual thing
-a provision 114 empowering the corporation to sue its debtors,
Tombeckbee Bank, 4 Port. 181 (Ala. 1836); Levert v. Planter's & Mer-
chant's Bank, 8 Port. 104 (Ala. 1839); Griffin v. Bank of Alabama, 6
Ala. 908 (1844); State Bank v. Dent, 12 Ala. 187 (1847); Bank of Mis-
sissippi v. Bush, Walk. 265 (Miss. 1827).
T14 1A typical form of the clause in question is that appearing in Log-
wood v. Planters' Bank, supra note 113, at 23: "If any person or per-
sons shall be indebted to said Corporation as maker or indorser of any note,
bill, or bond, expressly made negotiable and payable at said bank, and shall
delay payment thereof, it shall be lawful for the Corporation, after having
given at least ten days' notice thereof, and producing to the Court before
whom the motion is made, the certificate of the President of the Bank that
the debt is really and bona fide the property of the Bank, to move for judg-
ment against such debtor or debtors, his, her or their executors or ad-
ministrators, in any court of record within the territory. Provided always,
that if the defendant or defendants shall appear and contest the claim,
the Court shall instanter impanel a Jury to try the issue and thereon
give judgment accordingly."
But provisions of this sort were mild compared with that which came
before the United States Supreme Court in Bank of Columbia v. Sweeney,
2 Pet. 671 (U. S. 1829). Here it appears that by -what Chief Justice
Marshall refers to as "this extraordinary act," the legislature of Mary-
land in incorporating the Bank of Columbia in 1793 provided that, in
the case of persons indebted to the bank for money borrowed, or as
makers or indorsers of paper negotiable at the bank, who should make
default of payment for ten days after demand in writing, the president
of the bank, by sending to the clerk of the court the instrument of in-
debtedness with proof of the demand, and filing his own oath or affirmation
of the amount due, was authorized to require the clerk to issue "capias ad
satisfaciendum, fieri faeias or attachment by way of execution," subject
to the right of the defendant to dispute the claim, but not until the re-
turn of the execution.
Quite different is the clause met with in Young v. Bank of Alexandria,
5 Cranch 45 (U. S. 1809) and Yeaton v. Same, 5 Cranch 49 (U. S. 1809).
By this the legislature of Virginia conferred upon the plaintiff bank the
privilege of an expedited trial in suits by it upon bonds, bills or notes
expressly made negotiable at the bank, and also permitted it, in deroga-
tion of the general law, to sue the indorser of a promissory note, with-
out reference to the solvency or insolvency of the maker.
This favored treatment of banks as plaintiffs, at the period in ques-
tion, was not confined to a particular section of the country, as witness
the Rhode Island "bank process," successfully combated by Dorr, as v1
member of the legislature. Under that process, we are told, "if a debtor
failed to pay his note at the bank by three p. m. on the day when it be-
came due, an attachment, judgment, execution, levy and sale'might follow
the same day, so that before sunset of that day such a debtor's real
estate might become the property of the bank holding his protested note,
to the exclusion of the claims of all other creditors." EATON, THIOMAS
WILsoN BuRP, in 5 Luwis, GREAT AmRICAN LAWYERS (1908) 180.
A less striking instance of the same discriminatory policy is disclosed
by the Ohio statute of 1820, permitting banks or bankers, by way of
exception to the general rule, to sue jointly the drawers and indorsers
of negotiable paper. See Fullerton v. Bank of United States, 1 Pet. 604
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or some class of these, by means of notice and motion, instead
of the ordinary processes of the common law."0  But, whether
justified or not by contemporary economic conditions, this anom-
alous application of the remedy has had no influence upon its
subsequent history.
The manner of proceeding here in question seems to have had
its origin in Virginia. As early, at least, as 1732,111 statutes
begin to appear in this jurisdiction providing for summary judg-
ment on motion against sheriffs and other officers failing to
pay over public moneys to the proper recipient. In 1748, it was
enacted, with reference to forthcoming bonds given on execu-
tion, that such a bond should have the force of a judgment and,
if not paid, the court was empowered, "upon motion of the party
to whom the same is payable, to award execution thereupon, with
costs; provided the obligors have ten days notice of such mo-
tion." " In 1753, the sheriff or other officer failing to return an
execution is subjected to a fine for the benefit of the judgment-
creditor, recoverable by motion for judgment upon "ten days'
previous notice of the motion for judgment for such fine." 118
And in 1786 occurs the more noteworthy provision-forerunner
of many statutes of the same kind-that the surety who has
paid a judgment rendered against him for the principal's debt
may proceed against the principal by motion for judgment to
recover the amount so paid. 10 The same law extends the remedy
also to the case of one surety, who has thus had judgment ren-
dered against him, and is now seeking contribution from a co-
surety, where the principal has become insolvent.220  Again, in
1787, the proceeding is made available to a client for the recov-
(U. S. 1828); Lewis v. Bank of Kentucky, 12 Ohio 132 (1843); Clinton
Bank v. Hart, 19 Ohio 372 (1850). And for Kentucky, see ,.pra note 77.
135 In the case of the Bank of Alabama, the charter, pursuant to a
clause of the Constitution of 1819, requiring the remedy for the collec-
tion of debts to be reciprocal, provided for proceedings by notice and
motion both for and against the bank. Wrigglesworth v. Bank of Alabama,
1 Ala. 222 (1840).
116Acts of Mlay, 1732, c. 10, § 8, 4 VA. STAT. (Hening) 352. This
act relates to the failure of the sheriff to account to the secretary of
the colony and the clerk of the county court for fees coming to his hands.
Numerous later statutes prescribe the same remedy in respect of collecting
officers failing to pay over the proceeds of taxes and duties. E. g., 1736,
7 VA. STAT. (Hening) 12; 1759, ibid. 263; 1761, ibid. 396; 1762, ibid. 542;
(1769) 8 V-A. STAT. (Hening) 346; (1775) 9 VA. STAT. (Hening) 67;
1776, ibid. 222; cf. Acts of October, 1705, c. 9, § 9, 3 VA. STAT. (Hening)
266.
"1 Acts of October, 1748, c. 12, § 14, 5 VA. STT. (Hening) 534.
"Is Acts of November, 1753, c. 1, § 25, 6 VA. STAT. (Hening) 344.
-19 Acts of October, 1786, c. 15, §§ 1, 2, 12 VA. STAT. (Hening) 263.
oIbid. § 3.
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ery of money wrongfully withheld by an attorney. 121 It is not
here in place to review in detail the progress of this legislation;
suffice it to say that as time went on the remedy was applied to
other situations with such generosity that the first edition of
Robinson's Practice (1832) enumerates some twenty-five cat-
egories in which it is at a plaintiff's command. 11 2 With respect
to the proceeding itself, the author observes:
"In various cases the legislature have authorized judgment to
be entered and execution to be awarded, upon motion, in a sum-
mary way ": * * . In giving these summary remedies, the legis-
lature always provide that the party proceeded against shall be
given notice of the motion, for ten days, or some reasonable time
* * * In motions upon forthcoming bonds- and replevy bonds,
it is very common to give notice ore tenus. In other motions it
is usual for the plaintiff to write a notice to the defendant, of
the intended motion; and this written notice is returned to the
court in which the motion is made, with an affidavit shewing
that a copy thereof has been duly delivered." 123
As it was in Virginia that the proceeding had its inception,
so it was here that it took on an entirely new significance. This
occurred in 1849, at the instance of the revisers whose labors
culminated in the Code of that year. In their report they in-
formed the legislature, that
"by this mode of proceeding, all claims of the Common-
wealth, and a large number of those of individuals are now re-
coverable; yet a formal point scarcely ever arises upon a motion.
The case is very generally decided upon its merits. A brief
notice serves the double purpose of a writ and a declaration;
.and though a defendant is not precluded from pleading, yet as
the case can be heard without pleading, pleadings are in fact
very rarely filed. Seeing that this mode of proceeding has
worked well in the cases in which it has been heretofore allowed,
it seems to us advisable to extend it to all cases in which a person
is now entitled to recover money by action on a contract. We do
not propose to take away the right of bringing an action from any
person; we propose merely, when his claim to money is on a
contract, to allow him to use, if he please, the more simple remedy
by motion, instead of an action. The permission to proceed in
this way will, we believe, cause motions gradually to take the
place of actions for all such claims." 124
The result was the inclusion in the Code of 1849 of certain
sections appropriate to this purpose. It was provided that:
121 Acts of October, 1787, c. 10, § 3, 12 VA. STAT. (Hening). 473.
122 Pp. 589-621.
23 P. 589.
124 Report of Revisers, cited in Wilson v. Dawson, 96 Va. 687, 691 (1899).




"any person entitled to recover money by action on any
contract, may, on motion * * * obtain judgment for such money
after sixty days' notice, which notice shall be returned to the
clerk's office of such court forty .days before the motion is
heard.""2
And further that:
"on a motion when issue of fact is joined, and either
party desire it, or when, in the opinion of the court it is proper,
a jury shall be empanneled, unless the case be one in which the
recovery is limited to an amount not greater than twenty dol-
lars, exclusive of interest." '2r
In this form the statute remained until ISS7, when by the re-
vision of that year the time of notice was cut down to fifteen
days with modification, also, of the post-return period, it now
being provided that the notice should be returned ten days be-
fore the commencement of the term.12 7 In 1896, a provision was
included extending to this form of proceeding the requirement
bf an affidavit of merits from the defendant in case of affidavit
of claim made by the plaintiff.2 3 But by 1912 the remedy had
attained such additional growth in favor as to call for a further
enlargement of its scope. By a process of amendment beginning
in that year, it was made applicable to actions of tort, -  to ac-
tions on contracts not previously falling within its sphere,' -, to
actions for statutory penalties 131 and to actions for the recovery
of specific personal property or damages in lieu thereof.3 2- This
movement had its logical outcome in the revision of 1919, by
which the remedy became available for common law actions in
general, through the provision that "any person entitled to main-
tain an action at law may, in lieu of such action, proceed by
motion." "33
After 1887 the proceeding also underwent some re-regulation
with respect to its time requirements. Thus, by the amendment
of 1896, there ceased to be any appointment of a secondary or
post-return period, or any necessity of return in advance of the
hearing term: the substituted provision was that the notice
should be returned within five days after service and should be
' Z VA. CODE (1849) c. 167, § 5.
126 Ibid. § 6.
127 VA. CODE (1887) § 3211.
128 VA. ACTS (1896) 140.
129 VA. ACTS (1912) 15.
130 Ibid. 651.
is, Ibd.
132VA. AcTs (1916) 760.
'
2
= VA. CODE (1919) § 6046. For a fuller account of the amendments
leading up to the enactment of this provision, see Revisers' Note to the
section in question.
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docketed upon the lapse of the notice-period. 18' And, when in
1912, the remedy was extended to actions of tort, thirty days'
notice was here prescribed, instead of the usual fifteen.' But
now, under the revision of 1919 and the further amendment of
1922, the notice-period for all cases of the general proceeding,
is one of at least fifteen days and ordinarily not more than ninety
days; return of the notice continues to be called for within five
days after service; but the cause is now docketed on the return-
day, that is to say, the day named in the notice for the making of
the motion.a8
With respect to the form of the defendant's allegations, it
has been seen that, under the practice prior to the Code of 1849,
there was no duty resting upon him to put these in writing.
For nearly half a century thereafter there was no pronounce-
ment on the part of the Supreme Court or the legislature in any
way at variance with this idea. Indeed, on more than one oc-
casion the court, at least by way of dictum, had expressly recog-
nized the right of the defendant to plead ore tenus in this mode
of proceeding:17 Nevertheless, it appears to have been a fairly
prevalent custom to file formal pleas as in an ordinary action
or else "the trouble is usually solved by the plaintiff calling for
a statement of the grounds of defense" under the general pro-
vision relating to bills of particulars. 3 8 In 1895, however, this
24 VA. Acrs (1895-1896) 140; M. P. BURKS, PLEADINU AND PRACTICE
IN AcTIoNs AT COMION LAW (1st ed. 1913) 164-165. By the revision of
1887, as above appears, the notice was to be returned ten days before the
term. Under the Code of 1849, although this was silent as to the time of
the return with relation to the commencement of the term, requiring only
that the notice be returned forty days before hearing, it was held that this
return had to be in advance of the opening of the term: in other words,
that the cause had to be "matured for the docket before the term." Hale
v. Chamberlain, 13 Gratt. 658 (Va. 1857), as interpreted by Hanks v.
Lyons, 92 Va. 30 (1895).1 85VA. AcTs (1912) 15.
180 VA. CODE (1919) § 6046; VA. ACTs (1922) 763; Morrissett, Logisla-
tion of 1922 (1922) 8 VA. L. REG. (N. S.) 81, 97-98. The ninety day maxi-
mum may be exceeded where the next term does not commence within
ninety days from the date of service.
137 See Cecil v. Early, 10 Gratt. 198, 202 (Va. 1853) ; Supervisors v. Dunn,
27 Gratt. 608 620 (Va. 1876); Bunch's Ex'rs v. Fluvanna County, 86 Va.
452, 454 (1890); see also Pairo v. Bethell, 75 Va. 825, 830 (1881). Hall
v. Ratliff, 93 Va. 327 (1896), decided after Preston v. Salem Improvement
Co., infra note 139, and without reference to the holding in the latter,
is to the same effect.
188 M. P. Burks, Note to Wilson v. Dawson (1899) 4 VA. L. REG. 753. See
also BuRKs, op. cit. supra note 134, at 174. Under date of 1892 it is
said: "The statute of Virginia prescribes no mode of pleading by which
the defence to a motion may be presented to the court, but it is a com-
mendable practice which prevails in some of the circuits to require the
defendant either when he enters his appearance, or at some reasonable
time thereafter, to put in writing in sufficiently explicit terms the grounds
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practice was materially affected by the decision of the Supreme
Court in Preston v. Salein Improvement Co.1z 9 It was here held,
in a suit by motion to recover money due on contract, that the
right to a jury trial existed only, according to the statute,
"where an issue of fact is joined," 140 and that before there could
be a joinder of issue, there must be written allegations on the
part of the defendant. But, for this purpose, the court indi-
cated that, as an alternative to the common law plea or pleas
appropriate to the action, it was open to the defendant to em-
ploy an "informal statement in writing."
"As the object of this proceeding by motion under section
3211," said the court, "was to give suitors a plain and summary
proceeding for the recovery of judgments, and it is but in accord-
ance with the spirit of this flexible proceeding by motion to per-
mit the defendant to make his defense by such informal pleas
or statement in writing as will state his defense and make up the
issue to be tried, this latter practice is permissible, except in all
cases where the statute requires the plea to be verified by affi-
davit."
This interpretation has since been accepted by the legislature
and transformed into a rule applicable to the proceeding whether
the trial is by jury or by the court alone; the revision of 1919
specifically declares that
"the defendant may make the same defenses to the notice as to
a declaration in an action at law, and in the same manner, or he
may state his grounds of defense informally in writing, and in
the latter event the parties shall be deemed to be at issue on the
grounds stated without replication on the part of the plaintiff." I4l
There can be no doubt that an important element operating
in favor of the remedy is the sympathetic consideration which
it has received at the hands of the courts from the earliest period
of its history. In 1797, speaking with reference to a proceeding
by motion instituted by a sheriff against his deputy and the sure-
ties of the latter, to recover execution-moneys not accounted for,
Roane, J., said:
"I am strongly inclined to view notices with indulgence, see-
ing that they are the acts not of lawyers but of the parties." -42
upon which he rests his defence to a motion for judgment for money."
2 BARTON, PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF THE LAW iN Civxi C, Es (2d ed.
1892) 1047.
139 91 Va. 583 (1895).
4.A4. CODE (1887) § 3213.
141VA CODE (1919) § 6046. Where there is a general denial of the
plaintiff's claim, "like other general issues, it may be pleaded orally, but all
other defenses must be set up in writing." Duncan v. Carzon, 127 Va.
306, 313 (1920).
142 Drew v. Anderson, 1 Call 50, 52 (Va. 1797).
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This became the settled canon of construction. The foregoing
expression was reiterated and expanded in Supervisors v,
Dunn (1876)2 43 in the following terms:
"The rule governing notices is that they are presumed to be
the act of the parties and not of lawyers. They are viewed with
great indulgence by the courts; and if the terms of the notice
be general, the court will construe it favorably, and apply it
according to the truth of the case, as far as the notice will admit
of such application. If it be such that the defendant cannot
mistake the object of the motion, it will be sufficient." 144
In the latter case, as in the former, the motion was one under
a special statute, but the same doctrine unreservedly obtains
wherever the proceeding is used.
"A proceeding by motion under Virginia Code (1904) see.
3211," said the court in Whitley v. Booker B-ick Co. (1912)1 41
"is intended to furnish a simpler, more expeditious, and less
expensive remedy for the collection of debts than by action,
and the same is true of motions generally. Hence, we find that
the uniform course of decision in this State has been to view
with more leniency and to allow greater laxity in the pleadings
in that form of procedure." 146
On the other hand, "this does not relieve the plaintiff of the
requirement that he set out in his notice to the defendant matter
sufficient to maintain the action, and whether or not he has done
this is the sole question raised by the demurrer to the notice." 14
Nor is it open to the plaintiff to allege one thing and prove
another: "the rule that the allegat and probata must correspond
is likewise applicable to proceedings by way of motion." I'l
The gain from the use of this proceeding is not confined to
its doing away with the formal writ and its simplification of
the pleadings. Under the Virginia practice as to terms of court,
24327 Gratt. 608, 612 (Va. 1876).
1- Citing Graves v. Webb, 1 Call 443 (Va. 1797); Segouino v. Auditor,
4 Munf. 398 (Va. 1815); Steptoe v. Auditor, 3 Rand. 221 (Va. 1825).
145 113 Va. 434, 436 (1912).
140 Accord: Rinehart v. Pirkey, 126 Va. 346, 352 et seq. (1919) ; Shreck v.
Va. Hot Springs Co., 140 Va. 429, 432 (1924). But the presumption origin-
ally underlying the doctrine seems to have been discarded. "The procedure
by notice under section 6046 of the Code is looked upon with great indul-
gence, not because the notice is supposed to be the act of a layman ignorant
of forms of law, for that would be contrary to almost universal experience,
but because the courts are loath to sacrifice substance to form and desire,
so far as possible, to avoid that result." Per Burks, J., in Mankin v.
Aldridge, 127 Va. 761, 767 (1920).
1 7 Security Loan Co. v. Fields, 110 Va. 827, 829-830 (1910). Accord:
Matthews v. La Prade, 130 Va. 408, 413 (1921); Wessel v. Bargamin,
137 Va. 701, 707 (1923).
148 BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE, at 170.
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it enables the plaintiff to move more rapidly than would other-
wise be possible.
"The second and chief advantage," says the author Of the stand-
ard work on modern Virginia common law practice, "is that
you may proceed by motion when it is too late to mature a regu-
lar action, or even after a term of court has begun, if it shall
continue in session long enough for this purpose, as many of the
city courts do. It requires two sets of rule days to mature a
regular action, but you may proceed by motion, as just stated,
after either or both sets of rule days have passed, and if there is
time enough to give the requisite notice, may thus proceed to
obtain judgment by motion when it will be too late to obtain it
by a regular action." 1 9
The success of the remedy is plainly attested by the pains
recently taken for its extension and improvement, as well as by
the numerous cases in the court of review in which the plain-
tiff has elected to utilize it. That success, moreover, is unquali-
fied. In 1895, when the general proceeding was still confined
to actions on contracts, we find it stated by competent authority
"that in plain cases the summary remedy by motion has almost
superseded the common law forms of action for the recovery
of debts." 110 Since its extension in 1919, while it has not as
yet dislodged the other common law actions to the same degree,
it has made constant and increasing inroads upon their prov-
ince. 51  The probability is, therefore, that in time there will
occur in Virginia what has happened on sundry occasions in
the history of procedure on the Continent of Europe, namely,
that the summary procedure has become the ordinary one.
But the career of the remedy in Virginia does not tell the
whole story. For, with other Virginia institutions, the pro-
ceeding by motion found place in the legislation of West Vir-
ginia. The latter's first Code, that of 1870, besides putting it
at the plaintiff's. disposal in sundry single instances, reproduced
verbatim the contemporary Virginia provisions with reference
:149 Ibid 168.
25o E. C. Burks, Note to Hanks v. Lyons (1895) 1 VA. L. REv. 441.
" "I can confidently say * * that the summary proceeding, by notice
and motion, under the Virginia statute, is popular with the Virginia bar,
and that it is much used. It has been more used, certainly, since the
remedy has been extended to any action at law. It is more popular
with some attorneys than with others, and in some localities than in
other localities. I think I can say, however, that whenever an attorney
finds that he has a case in which he must draw his declaration with
extreme care in order to avoid a troublesome demurrer, he will relieve
himself of some of his uncasiness by filing his notice and motion. I think
the statute has been altogether beneficial and a great boon to lawyers
who desire to avoid the pitfalls of common law pleadings." President
Prentis of the Supreme Court of Appcals, in letter to the present writer.
under date of November 19, 1927.
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to its general use in actions on contracts to recover money.
There was added, however, the declaration that "defense to such
motions may be made in the manner and to the same extent as
in actions at law." 15 2 In 1882, the statute was amended so as
to shorten the period of notice and the period which must elapse
between the return of notice and the hearing, from the original
sixty and forty days, respectively, to thirty and twenty days.",,
By further amendments, adopted in 1915, these periods were
again abridged, the former to twenty and the latter to fifteen
days, and provision was made for affidavit of claim and affidavit
of merits as in the ordinary procedure.,, Meanwhile, it had
been necessary that the notice be returned in advance of the
hearing term; 115 but in 1925 this rule was changed and brought
into substantial alignment with the later Virginia rule by the
provision that the motion "may be commenced and matured dur-
ing the term * * * and may be heard at the same term," if this
has not expired before the lapse of the notice-period. 15 Thus,
the remedy, in West Virginia, apart from special instances, re-
mains limited to cases Where the plaintiff "is entitled to recover
money by action on any contract." 257
In dealing with the sufficiency of the notice, the West Virginia
courts follow the Virginia doctrine which accords its contents
a liberal construction," but contemplates the statement of a
good cause of action.- 9 Its purpose is said to be that of ac-
quainting the defendant with the grounds on which the plain-
tiff proposes to proceed against him, and "all that is required
in such notice is that it should be so plain that the defendants
cannot mistake the objects of the motion, however it may be
wanting in form and technical accuracy." 100 The means com-
monly employed to question the sufficiency of the notice is a
motion to quash, rather than a demurrer as used in Virginia,
but its operation is precisely the same.' 0' Concerning the mode
of pleading defenses, it may be said that the statutory provision
in this regard, namely, that defense "may be made in the same
manner and to the same extent as in actions at law" has not
12 W. VA. CODE (1870) c. 121, §§ 6-8, p. 593.
153W. VA. AcTs (1882) 171.
15 W. VA. AcTs (1915) 449.
2]Kn~x v. Homer, 58 W. Va. 136 (1905); Citizens' Nat. Bank v.
Dixon, 94 W. Va. 21 (1923).
150W. VA. AcTs (1925) 283.
157 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) 2133-2135.
158 Board of Education v. Parsons, 22 W. Va. 308 (1883).
'159 Hastings v. Grump, 89 W. Va. 111 (1921); Anderson v. Prince, 60
W. Va. 557 (1906).
" B5 Shepard v. Brown, 30 W. Va. 13, 19 (1887). Accord: Stuart v.
Carter, 79 W. Va. 92 (1916); People's State Bank v. Jeffries, 99 W. Va.
399 (1925).
101 Jennings v. Wiles, 82 W. Va. 573 (1918).
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resulted in any material difference from the eisting Virginia
practice. This provision, said the Supreme Court of Appeals
in 1911,
.*is permissive, not mandatory. It was passed long
after the character of the proceeding by motion had been judi-
cially established. It says, not that defense shall be made in the
same manner as in actions at law, but that it may be so made.
* - * The old common law rule, making a plea and joinder of
issue essential to the trial of a case is still adhered to by this
Court, in common law actions, but is always reluctantly applied,
when it appears that the parties have treated the issues as hav-
ing been made up and fully submitted their respective claims
and contentions to the jury. If it were possible, consistently,
to avoid reversals for such cause the Court would cheerfully
do so. It looks upon the rule with great disfavorc2r-  Hence,
we are not disposed to extend it to summary and informal pro-
ceedings in which it has not hitherto been applied. Substantial
justice requires statements of the nature of the demand and
the defenses, sufficient to give each of the parties notice of what
is asserted against him and constitute a basis for the introduc-
tion of evidence; but it does not require any particular formality
in them. It is enough that the respective claims and conten-
tions of the palties are put into the record."113
This is virtually the same rule as under the Virginia statute of
1919.
Concededly, the progress of the remedy has been slower here
than in Virginia. Not only has legislation in respect of its
scope halted with adoption of the Virginia provision of 1849,
but even in the case of the contract actions for which it was
thus made available, its employment has not been as extensive
as in the older State. Nevertheless, this employment is on the
increase, and at present approxmately half the number of these
actions are brought in the summary form. Moreover, since the
Virginia amendment of 1919 attempts have been made to ob-
tain here the adoption of a similar statute. In view of the grow-
ing favor which attends the remedy, the prospects are that this
manner of legislation will not be long deferred. For West Vir-
ginia, therefore, it is apparently but a question of time until
the remedy attains a success equal to that which it has already
achieved in Virginia.1 64
162 Citing Simpkins v. White, 43 W. Va. 125 (1897).
163 Collins v. White Oak Fuel Co., 69 W. Va. 292, 295 (1911).
S64 These statements are based upon information received from the Hon.
Harold A. Ritz of Charleston, W. Va., formerly one of the judges of
the Supreme Court of Appeals. Specifically, Judge Ritz says, in a letter
to the present writer, under date of November 25, 1927: "For many yearo,
this form of action was not very much used in West Virginia. In the
last few years, however, it is coming into very much more general use.
The younger members of the bar, I believe, are using it in most cases
where it is applicable, and it is entirely probable that in the ne.,t few
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years it will practically supersede the common law actions for the recovery
of debts in this State, as it has in Virginia. There have been efforts
in the Legislature to make the same form of action apply to causes of
action arising out of tort, and no doubt this will be done as the bar
becomes more familiar with the use of the remedy. There is no reason
why it should not be made to apply to tort actions, if the cause of action
be fairly stated in the notice. * * * I should say that in perhaps fifty per
cent of the ordinary contract actions, this form is used in this State at
this time, and I have no doubt it will become more popular as it becomes
more familiar."
